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DIGEST OF RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOCAL ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
LOW ALTITUDE FLIGHTS IN AIRPORT APPROACH ZONE
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,708 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 1955).
Defendant village, situated within one mile of New York International
Airport, known as "Idlewild," passed an ordinance prohibiting air flight
over the town at less than 1,000 feet. Plaintiffs, comprising ten airline
companies, the Port of New York Authority, the Air Line Pilots Association
International, and nine air pilots in their individual capacities brought suit
to enjoin the enforcement of this ordinance. The Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics and the Civil Aeronautics Board intervened as plaintiffs. The
court, stating that air travel is a form of interstate commerce and therefore
regulated by the federal government, held that Congress had adopted a
comprehensive plan for the regulation of air traffic in the navigable airspace
and therefore by preemption had precluded local legislation. Moreover,
although the Civil Aeronautics Board had issued landing regulations which
under certain weather conditions required an approach over the village of
Cedarhurst at an altitude of 450 feet, these regulations were a valid exercise
of the authority delegated to the Board by Congress under the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that
Congress had not intended to regulate the first 1,000 feet of airspace above
the land surface, and that this airspace was not "navigable airspace" within
the meaning of the Act of 1938. The definition of "navigable airspace" was
held to include all necessary take-off and landing altitudes. The court further
stated that Congress has not recognized private rights in airspace, and at
any rate, the public interest required a free access to the airport at the
altitude designated by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
UNFAIR- COMPETITION IN USE OF WORD "AMERICAN" IN
TRADE NAME OF AIRLINE
North Am. Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B.
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,698 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1955).
Petitioner sought review of a Board order which denied its application
for authority to engage in air transportation under the name North Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., and which further ordered the petitioner to cease and
desist from using any combination of the word "American" in its trade
name. American Airlines, Inc. was allowed to intervene in opposition to
the petitioner's application, alleging that the name "North American"
infringed upon the established name of American and constituted unfair
competition. The Board found that the likelihood of confusion between the
two companies by the general public warranted the order as issued. The
Board also concluded that although there was no evidence that North
American adopted its name with intent to deceive the public, the name
"American" had acquired a secondary meaning in the field of air travel
synonymous with American Airlines. The court held that the public interest
did not require the Board to supervise the selection of trade names by
airline applicants. Section 411 of the Civil Aeronautics Act which gives the
Board the responsibility of safeguarding the public interest against unfair
competition was patterned after Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act which did not provide private persons with administrative remedies for
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMIERCE
private wrongs. The possibility that American Airlines might succeed in
a private suit for trade-mark infringement did not dictate a finding of
unfair competition over which the Board had jurisdiction. The Court stated
that the word "American" had been used by other airline companies, and
that there was no evidence of substantial confusion caused by the use of
the name "North American." Congress had not intended the Board to
adjudicate issues arising in the field of trade-marks, and the public interest
did not require a finding of unfair competition merely because of the use
of the word "American."
TORTS-ACTION BY AIRLINES AGAINST PLANE
MANUFACTURER FOR FAULTY DESIGN
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co.
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,682 (6th Cir. May 31, 1955).
Plaintiff airline sued a plane manufacturer, on the basis of negligence
in design and construction, for loss of an aircraft which crashed and for
the loss of use of four other planes. The defects in all the planes were
caused by broken wing joints which developed from fatigue cracks. The
defendant claimed that it had used not only reasonable care, but very great
care, in the manufacture and design of the planes. It contended alternatively
that if there was a finding of negligence, the plaintiff had assumed the
risk of danger or was guilty of contributory negligence. It was shown that
during the period of manufacture personnel representing the airline were
stationed at defendant's plant. This group included an engineer, inspectors,
and pilots who inspected the planes during different phases of construction.
The court found that there was no evidence of actual notice of the defects
on the part of the airline personnel, and also found that the defects were
not so obvious as to constitute constructive notice. The defense on the basis
of assumption of risk therefore failed. The court further held that since
the airline did not participate in the manufacture of the planes in which the
fatigue cracks appeared it was not guilty of contributory negligence. The
question of the manufacturer's negligence was left to the jury.
WRONGFUL DEATH-SUBPOENA OF AIRLINE RECORDS-
WARSAW CONVENTION
Supine v. Compagnie Nationale Air France
(E.D.N.Y. June 8, 1955)
An action for wrongful death was brought against Air France after a
plane crash in the Azores in which all the occupants were killed. The plane
was on an international flight at the time. The plaintiff subpoenaed three
classes of documents: (1) regulations and rules in regard to defendant's
flights; (2) advertising releases in regard to defendant's flights; and
(3) reports of prior accidents. Defendant sought to quash the subpoenas
on the ground that plaintiff did not show good cause for producing them.
However, it was pointed out that under the Warsaw Convention, which
governs international flights, a plaintiff can only recover $8,296 unless he
can prove that an accident was caused by the airline's willful misconduct.
Because of this heavy burden of proof, the court refused to quash the sub-
poena. The court also refused to vacate plaintiff's notice of taking oral
depositions from some of defendant's employees who were stationed abroad.
The court said that since defendant airlines has its own transportation
facilities it is not unreasonable to require their employees to come to New
York.
DIGEST OF RECENT CASES
VALIDITY OF PROVISION LIMITING TIME FOR SUIT
IN AIR CARRIER'S TICKET
Herman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
222 F. 2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955)
Plaintiff's ticket contained a clause which limited liability on the part
of the defendant to suits brought within one year of the date of an injury
caused by defendant's negligence. The action was not brought within the
permissive period and the plaintiff sought to have the time limitation held
invalid. The court said that a common carrier is not permitted to set as
short a period as it pleases within which a passenger must sue for damages
arising from its negligence, but that it may set a "reasonable" period. One
year was held to be a reasonable period.
TORTS-LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED AIRPORTS
City of Knoxville v. Bailey
222 F. 2d 520 (6th Cir. 1955)
A plane passenger was injured at an airport when she fell down while
walking from one platform to another. She sued both the municipal corpo-
ration which owned the airport and the airline from which she purchased
her ticket. The municipality defended on the basis of a state statute which
specifically stated that the operation of airports by municipal corporations
was a governmental function and that suits against them arising out of
such operations were barred. The court recognized the power of the state
legislature to designate functions as governmental so as to bar suits against
municipalities, but held that where a municipality acquires insurance to
cover personal injuries incurred on its property it thereby waives its
immunity to suits arising from performance of a governmental function.
The court upheld the verdict against the air carrier stating that the carrier
owed its passengers the duty of ordinary care while they await passage on
its line even though the airline merely rented the space in common with
other airlines.
CONTRACTS-LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED AIRPORTS
City of Jackson v. Brummett (Miss. Sup. Ct. June 13, 1955)
80 So. 2d 827 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1955)
Pursuant to an oral agreement between plaintiff and defendant's em-
ployee, plaintiff's aircraft was parked at an airport which was maintained
by the defendant municipal corporation under authority of a state statute.
While the plane was so situated a sudden storm arose. As a result the
aircraft was broken from its moorings and damaged. Plaintiff charged
negligence on the part of the defendant because of the use of rotten ropes
to tie down the plane. The defendant denied the charge of improper care
and, alternatively, argued immunity to suit because the operation of the
airport was a governmental rather than a corporate function. The state
statute authorizing operation of airports by municipalities permitted the
corporation to "operate for income." The court construed that provision to
mean that the municipality was acting in a corporate rather than a govern-
mental capacity, and therefore found that the corporation was subject to a
suit for breach of contract. The court also held that an injury was not
caused by an act of God if it could have been prevented by the use of
reasonable care.
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AIRCRAFT INSURANCE POLICY-EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
Bruce v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.
222 F. 2d 642 (4th Cir. 1955)
During a public demonstration of safe flying techniques, an airplane
failed to pull out of an intentionally induced spin, and a passenger was
killed. The administratrix of the decedent's estate obtained a judgment
against the flying school which had sponsored the demonstration. The
company which had insured the flying school refused to pay, and this action
was brought to secure the judgment. The company argued that, by an
exclusion clause, the policy was not to apply to any liability incurred where
the aircraft was used "in violation of any government regulation for civil
aviation." Civil Air Regulations prohibit "aerobatic" flight unless all occu-
pants have parachutes. Here, no parachutes had been provided. Although
it was shown that a parachute would not have helped decedent because of
the low altitude at which the maneuvers were performed, the court affirmed
a decision for the insurance company. The court said that "an insurer need
not show a casual connection between the breach of an exclusion clause and
the accident, if the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, since the
rights of the insured flow from the contract of insurance and not from a
claim arising in tort."
